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Anatomy of a Sovereign Debt Crisis:
CDS Spreads and Real-Time Macroeconomic Data
ABSTRACT
We construct a unique and comprehensive data set of 19 real-time daily macroeconomic
indicators for 11 Eurozone countries, for the 5/11/2009–4/25/2013 period. We use this
new data set to characterize the time-varying dependence of the cross-section of sovereign
credit default swap (CDS) spreads on country-specific macro indicators. We employ daily
Fama-MacBeth type cross-sectional regressions to produce time-series of macro-sensitivities,
which are then used to identify risk regimes and forecast future equity market volatility. We
document pronounced time-variation in the macro-sensitivities, consistent with the notion
that market participants focused on very different macro indicators at the different times of
the crisis. Second, we identify three distinct crisis risk regimes, based on the general level of
CDS spreads, the macro-sensitivities, and the GIPSI connotation. Third, we document the
predictive power of the macro-sensitivities for future option-implied equity market volatility,
consistent with the notion that expected future risk aversion is an important driver of how
CDS spreads impound macro information.
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Introduction
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis clearly exhibits three fundamental turning points. The
first turning point is in October 2009, when Greek Finance Minister George Papaconstanti-
nou discloses that the true budget deficit for 2009 was 12.5% of GDP, more than twice
the previously announced figure. From this point in time on, after a decade of disconnect,
different macroeconomic fundamentals begin to translate into very different assessments of
sovereign default probabilities and recovery rates.
The second turning point is in April 2010, when Greece activates a 45 billion Euros
EU-IMF bailout, and S&P downgrades Greek debt to junk status.1 The yields on Greek
long-term debt jump immediately in response to news about a future potential default, soon
followed by spreads of sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries facing similar fiscal troubles
(Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
The third turning point is at the time of Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge, made
on July 26, 2012, and the subsequent announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) program (August 2012), through which the European Central Bank will make pur-
chases (outright transactions) in the secondary bond markets of Eurozone member states.
As a result, spreads on the sovereign bonds of more vulnerable Eurozone countries start
trending down and the sovereign debt crisis begins to subside.
What we know from the extensive literature on the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is that
most of the increase in the price of sovereign risk was due to a deterioration in countries’ fun-
damentals coupled with fundamentals’ contagion (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) and feedback
1On April 25, 2010, namely 2 days before the S&P’s downgrading, the Financial Times wrote “This is
going to be the most important week in the 11-year history of Europe’s monetary union. By the end of it
we will know whether the Greek fiscal crisis can be contained or whether it will metastasize to other parts
of the Eurozone.”
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loops between sovereign and domestic bank risks (Acharya et al., 2018; Bolton and Olivier,
2011). We also know that the OMT program was successful in lowering spreads of sovereign
bonds issued by more exposed European countries (Krishnamurthy et al., 2018). However,
it has proven so far very challenging to explain the bulk of the high-frequency variation in
sovereign spreads or Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia by means of fundamentals.
We show that what matters is ultimately not the level of macro fundamentals, which
indeed evolve very smoothly. Rather, it is the importance that markets attach to different
fundamentals. We show that this is very low at the outset of the crisis: in this phase,
markets “panic,” with some countries paying for their mere belonging to a set of vulnerable
countries. This explains why an abrupt, substantial repricing of risks may take place against
unchanged, or only marginally deteriorated, economic conditions. On the contrary, at the
height of the crisis, attention to economic fundamentals becomes extreme. Past the peak, we
get back to a virtual disconnect between market developments and macro fundamentals, with
spreads mostly driven by sentiment. Our results suggest that monetary policy intervention
can reduce spreads across the board in a time of crisis by providing the proverbial “tide that
lifts all boats” (e.g., De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). However, individual countries can ultimately
improve their funding costs only by intervening on their own macro fundamentals.
In order to study the “anatomy” of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, we carry out a
detailed analysis of the relation between the pricing of sovereign risk and a comprehensive
set of macroeconomic fundamentals, as they are disclosed to the public in real-time. We
are the first to perform this type of exercise. In fact, most of the empirical work on the
topic has used revised macroeconomic data.2 The very few papers employing real-time data
2A “revised vs. real-time bias” has been brought to attention, for example, by Ghysels et al. (2018) in
the context of bond return predictability, showing that real-time macroeconomic data have a much lower
predictive power than final, revised data.
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have focused on macro-news announcements (e.g., Kim et al., 2015; Beetsma et al., 2013),
relating changes in sovereign CDS spreads to the “distance” between released and expected
quantities. However, this approach suffers from two main limitations. First, given that
macro announcements are not synchronized across countries, it is not possible to implement
a pure cross-sectional analysis of the responses of CDS spreads to news. Hence, if there is
time variation in these responses, the time variation needs to be modeled explicitly. Second,
data on consensus forecasts are available for only few macroeconomic variables and countries.
Hence, any feasible empirical analysis can only be limited in scope.
In our analysis, on the other hand, we are able to use data for all trading days and
for a rich cross-section of macro indicators. This approach allows us to accommodate
time-variation in the relation between spreads and fundamentals, without having to model
such relation explicitly. This is important, as we document that the variation in macro-
sensitivities—the coefficients relating the pricing of default risk to macro fundamentals—is
substantial, with the set of relevant variables itself varying drastically from one “regime” to
another. Moreover, we are able to include in the analysis a broad set of indicators, for which
consensus forecasts are not available. This is also important because, at times, we find that
less-known macro indicators play an important role in explaining the cross-section of CDS
spreads.
Specifically, we use the ECB e-archives to construct a unique real-time, daily-frequency
data set on 19 macroeconomic fundamentals, for 11 Eurozone countries over the period
from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013. We then relate the cross-section of sovereign CDS spreads of
different maturity to the macro fundamentals, employing data for all of the trading days in
the sample.
While the literature agrees that during the European crisis sovereign bond prices and
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CDS spreads exhibited excessive sensitivity to macroeconomic indicators (Aizenman et al.,
2018; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2013), a clear understanding on how market prices incorporated
information on country-specific fundamentals over time is still missing. This is our first
contribution. Based on our real-time macroeconomic data set, we characterize and interpret
the cross-section of sovereign CDS spreads. Analytically, we implement a Fama-MacBeth
procedure in which, for each day, the sovereign CDS spreads for the 11 Eurozone countries at
3, 5, 7, and 10 years are regressed on the 19 country-specific macro fundamentals, controlling
for the level and volatility of an indicator of banking risk, and for being part of the GIPSI
group of countries. These covariates are employed individually, to capture “level” effects, and
then interacted with the maturities of the CDS contracts, to capture “slope” effects. Given
the large initial set of covariates, we implement a LASSO-type approach to the regression
analysis (Tibshirani, 1996). In doing this, first, we reduce the dimensionality of the space
of covariates, making the estimation procedure feasible; second, we implement a day-by-
day variable selection procedure, discarding those covariates that make no contribution in
explaining the cross-section of CDSs. The daily LASSO-type cross-sectional coefficients are
then stacked together, producing time-series of macro-sensitivities whose values tell us which
variables are important at any given time.
The daily time series of the LASSO-type coefficients are then used to detect homogeneous
clusters of observations. Such groups of observations, i.e., “regimes”, are identified through
the “medoid” clustering procedure introduced in Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990). This is our
second contribution. Our approach differs from existing papers which instead identify non-
crisis vs. crisis regimes based on the behavior of CDS/bond spreads alone (e.g., Blommestein
et al., 2016; Delatte et al., 2017).
Our third contribution has to do with the explanatory power of the cross-sectional regres-
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sion coefficients vis-a`-vis the future option-implied volatility of the European equity market.
In principle, our LASSO-type coefficients combine information on the cross-section of CDS
spreads with information on macro fundamentals, in a way that reflects the risk attitudes
of market participants.3 To explore this conjecture, we focus on the Euro Stoxx 50 volatil-
ity index (VSTOXX). This type of indicator has taken a central role in the debate on the
predictability of future economic activity, monetary policy stance, and financial instability
(e.g., Bekaert and Hoerova, 2014; Bekaert et al., 2013). High expected financial market
volatility is a signal of increased risk of adverse future economic conditions and, hence, of
a potential impending crisis (Danielsson et al., 2018). In doing this, we complement and
extend the analysis of Beber et al. (2015), who document significant explanatory power of
real-time macroeconomic indicators for future realizations of the VIX index. Our approach
differs from theirs, however, as our macro-sensitivities combine real-time macro data with
financial market indicators (the CDS spreads) to explain future realizations of an equity
volatility index. Indeed, we show that our approach is superior to that of using either the
macro indicators or the CDS spreads alone.
In terms of empirical results, our strategy delivers very good cross-sectional fit, with an
average cross-sectional R-square of 0.9850. For comparison, the model in Aizenman et al.
(2018) explains the cross-section of CDS spreads with R-squares between 0.7 and 0.8, during
the pre-crisis period, and between 0.45 and 0.60, during the crisis.4
3The explanatory power of cross-country macro-sensitivities is motivated by the systematic nature of
sovereign risk and the forward-looking properties of sovereign CDSs. Theoretically, this view is consistent
with the literature exploring how investors react to uncertainty about the state of the economy (Veronesi,
1999; Veronesi, 2014) and to expectations about future monetary policy (Faust et al., 2007).
4The papers by Nosbusch (2010), Longstaff et al. (2011) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011) share a
similarly disappointing fit. A notable exception is the recent paper by Augustin (2018), who models the
time-varying dynamics and cross-country heterogeneity of the term structure of sovereign CDS, showing that
global (local) shocks are the primary source of time variation for spreads when the term structure is upward
(downward)-sloping.
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Second, as discussed above, a clear link between sovereign spreads and macro fundamen-
tals is still elusive (Beber et al., 2014), because of the “revised vs. real-time bias” as well as
the abundance of variables that can be used as potential risk factors. Our Fama-MacBeth
procedure selects macroeconomic indicators based on their usefulness in pricing the cross
section of sovereign CDS spreads, selecting only the variables with non-zero coefficients, i.e.,
those covariates that matter most on any given day. The stacked LASSO-based coefficients
that we estimate over the entire time interval exhibit significant time variation.
An in-depth analysis of the behavior exhibited by the coefficients over time identifies three
distinct crisis regimes. While our results are generally consistent with those of Bernoth and
Erdogan (2013), we document pronounced volatility in the macro-sensitivities that is strongly
at odds with their conclusions that the relation between CDS spreads and fundamentals is
“changing gradually over time, rather than having a discrete break-point between regimes.”
By using real-time data, we find exactly the opposite pattern of variation, with significant
jumps in the macro-sensitivities. We set the pre-crisis regime to be the 5/11/2009 –3/31/2010
period, characterized by moderate macro-sensitivities, with the fiscal deficit and the GIPSI
dummy being the major determinants of sovereign risk, followed by our banking risk indica-
tor. Starting from April 2010, the time-series of the macro-sensitivities lead us to identify
three main crisis regimes: (i) the first regime is mainly characterized by the explanatory
power of the GIPSI dummy and the loan-to-government indicator, covering the first phase
of the crisis (April 2010–July 2011) and the Cyprus bank bailout (March–April 2013); (ii)
during the second regime, June–August 2011 and September 2012–mid March 2013, imports
and changes in inventories over GDP were the most influential variables, given their relevance
for future GDP growth; (iii) the third regime (July 2011–August 2012), corresponds to the
phase of highest risk, when the cross sections of sovereign CDS were mostly driven by GDP
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growth and employment. Interestingly, it is during this last regime that CDS spreads reflect
macro fundamentals the most. In other words, it is precisely when the overall perception of
sovereign default risk is greatest that country-specific macro information impacts prices the
most, consistent with the notion that these are the times when the returns from information
production are also the highest.5
Third, we document substantial out-of-sample explanatory power of the LASSO-type,
Fama-Macbeth coefficients for future option-implied equity market volatility, as it is captured
by the VSTOXX volatility index. Given the large number of macro-sensitivities, we employ
the LASSO algorithm a second time to identify the most robust specification. Moreover, we
perform the first-step cross-sectional regressions on the principal components of the original
macro indicators, following Beber et al. (2015).6 While macro indicators play a only a minor
role in explaining the slope of the term structure of CDS spreads, the coefficients capturing
slope effects have a substantial role in this out-of-sample predictive exercise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our real-time,
macro-indicator data set. Section II derives the empirical specification used in the cross-
sectional regression analysis. Section III presents the results of the Fama-Macbeth-style
cross-sectional regressions. Section IV discusses the methodology and evidence on the differ-
ent regimes. Section V presents the out-of-sample predictive exercise. Section VI concludes.
5This result stands in partial contrast with the evidence in Pasquariello (2014), who shows that market
dislocations—i.e., conditions where the markets cease to price assets correctly on an absolute and relative
basis—are more prevalent at the time of crisis.
6The principal components are constructed separately for sub-groups of macro indicators: (1) Labour
market; (2) Prices and costs; (3) Money and credit; (4) Output; (5) Banking.
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I Macroeconomic data in real-time
The dependent variable is the premium on sovereign CDSs at the 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturity,
over the 5/11/2009–4/25/2013 period, for a set of 11 Eurozone countries (see Figure 1a).
CDSs are financial contracts aimed at protecting the buyer of a bond from the default risk of
the issuer. For example, the seller of a CDS on a particular sovereign agrees to compensate
the buyer in case of a loss emanating from a credit event in the reference sovereign. Notice
that, unless an explicit ban is foreseen in the regulation of a specific jurisdiction, CDSs
can also be “naked,” i.e., bought by investors who do not own the underlying bond, and
are hence simply ‘betting’ against the issuer. Being sovereign CDSs similar to insurance
contracts protecting against a default of the counterparty, their price is a measure of the
perceived default risk associated with a particular sovereign entity. Our analysis covers the
following Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Figure 1a shows developments in the sovereign
CDS spreads for these countries during the sample. As in other studies using sovereign CDS
data (e.g., de Santis, 2015), Greece is not covered as data on Greek CDSs is not available
after September 2011.
We aim at explaining the dynamics in sovereign CDS prices based on a novel real-time
data set comprising country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals and macro-financial indi-
cators. Several studies have tried to explain sovereign debt crises by linking some measure
of sovereign stress to macro fundamentals. While earlier papers in this literature have used
standard, low-frequency data sets (e.g., Manasse and Roubini, 2009), only recently higher-
frequency data have been used for this purpose (Beber et al., 2014). More broadly, there is
a growing literature showing the importance of using real-time macroeconomic data for fore-
casting not only macroeconomic variables themselves (e.g., Giannone et al., 2005, and, more
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recently, Beber et al., 2014), but also financial variables (see Ghysels et al., 2018). Real-time
data sets are also needed to construct credible early warning models for financial crises (e.g.,
Alessi and Detken, 2011 and Alessi and Detken, 2014), as these models are intended to be
used by policymakers based on the information set that is available to them at each point
in time.
For these reasons, real-time data sets are becoming increasingly popular also beyond
the macro-econometric literature. However, to our knowledge, there are no existing real-
time data sets covering a large number of countries and a large number of macroeconomic
variables at high frequency. For the Euro area, in particular, the most well-known real-
time database is the one maintained by the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (EABCN,
see Giannone et al., 2012), which also started publishing real-time data for some individual
European countries. This data set, however, reports macroeconomic indicators at a monthly
frequency, and hence it is not suitable to pin down the high-frequency impact of data releases
on the financial markets.
Against this background, we construct a novel real-time data set at a daily frequency, cov-
ering 11 Eurozone countries and including 19 macroeconomic and macro financial indicators
reported in Table 1. Our real-time data set covers the following indicators:
• Labour market indicators: unemployment and employment rates.
• Prices and costs: inflation rate, industrial producer prices (% change), hourly labour
cost (% change).
• Money, credit and debt: growth of M3, loans to private sector, loans to government,
total credit to private sector, and total credit to government, as well as public sector
deficit over GDP.
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• Output: real GDP, consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, im-
ports and industrial production (all rates of growth) and changes in inventories over
nominal GDP.
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Figures 1b–1e show developments
in selected macro fundamentals during the crisis. Clearly, these variables change much more
smoothly than the CDSs spreads plotted in Figure 1a. The panel of time series is balanced,
with all of the above variables being available for each of the considered countries over the
whole time-span. In contrast, the data set used by Beber et al. (2014) includes a comparable
number of indicators for Germany, but many less for the other countries.
Our real-time data set is mostly based on European Central Bank e-archives. These e-
archives contain historical records of the information supplied to the public by the ECB. In
constructing the data set, we have taken into account the various lags with which new data
are released by the ECB, compared to the moment they are released by national statistical
institutes and national central banks. The latter date is the release date that matters, as
it corresponds to when new information reaches the markets for the first time. For this
purpose, official release dates have been retrieved or double-checked using information from
Bloomberg, Money Market Services (MMS), as well as information from national central
banks and statistics offices.
The structure of the data set differs from standard, lower-frequency, real-time data sets,
as it does not exhibit “vintages.” This is due to the different frequencies at which the
variables of interest are released (up to quarterly) and of the data set itself (daily). In fact,
the data set is structured as a standard panel of mixed-frequency time series. The difference
with respect to a standard data set is that, at each date, each of the macro variables listed
above takes the latest released value, instead of the value for the reference period, which is
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not known in real-time. For example, current Eurozone GDP growth will only be available
30 days after the end of this quarter (T+30), in the form of a preliminary flash estimate,
which will be revised 15 days later (T+45), while the second GDP release will be published
60 days after the end of this quarter (T+60).7 Some countries nowadays publish preliminary
GDP flash estimates, while some only publish GDP figures 60-70 days after the end of the
reference quarter.8 Moreover, data for GDP components may be released together with
a flash estimate or only with the second GDP release, depending on the country. Even
monetary and credit aggregates, which are released in a more timely manner as compared
to macroeconomic statistics, are published in the month following the reference month.
Given publication lags, market participants never really know the current state of the
economy. They base their decisions on a continuous flow of information, where data on
various macroeconomic and macro financial indicators are released with a different timeliness,
and revised afterwards. The real-time data set that we develop reflects the information set
available to market participants at each point in time, based on which they form expectations.
In this respect, our data set is similar to those used in “news” studies, such as Balduzzi et al.
(2001), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) and, more recently, Beber et al. (2014).
Finally, we complement our macroeconomic and macro financial real-time data set with
a market-based indicator, namely a proxy for country-specific banking risk. As documented
in the existing literature, the doom-loop between sovereign and bank credit risk was indeed
the hallmark of the 2009-2012 sovereign debt crisis in the periphery of the euro area (Brun-
nermeier et al., 2016). Computationally, in order to obtain a market-based, daily basis proxy
for banking risk, we used the country-specific banking equity index. More specifically, since
7Eurostat improved the timeliness of the Eurozone GDP flash estimate including a preliminary release at
T+30 days in 2016.
8Focusing on the countries covered in this study, no flash estimate is provided for Ireland.
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sovereign CDSs and banking equity indices are strongly correlated, we orthogonalized the
daily banking equity returns by regressing on the contemporaneous daily change in sovereign
CDS premia. Hence, the cumulative sums of residuals were used to construct our measure
of banking risk, which, by construction, is uncorrelated with the variations in CDS premia,
thereby reflecting the health status of the banking systems as measured by the market.
While the banking risk indicator, computed as a daily cumulative sum of residuals, reflects
the “level” of health of the banking systems, we also computed the 20-day rolling-window
realized volatility of the residuals, which gives us a measure of the uncertainty associated
with banks’ health.
II Sovereign risk pricing
We start from a general framework for the pricing of CDSs in an arbitrage-free setting. This
general framework motivates the specification used in the empirical analysis and provides
an economic justification for why the dependence of CDS premia on macro-fundamentals
may be time-varying and why the coefficients of cross-sectional regression of CDS spreads
on macro-fundamentals may be informative as to the expected future volatility of the equity
market.
II.A The general framework
For given country n, let snt denote the one-period CDS spread, and let rnt and pint denote
the recovery rate and default probability, respectively. Consider the payoff of a one-period
CDS with a $1 face value, and assume, for simplicity, that default can only take place at
time 1:
cnt = max{1− rnt, 0}. (1)
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Under standard assumptions, absence of arbitrage implies that there exists a stochastic
discount factor mt+1 such that:
9
snt
1 + it
= Et(mt+1cnt+1), (2)
where it denotes the rate of interest, and where Et(mt+1cnt+1) can be broken into the CDS
risk-neutral valuation and the CDS risk premium, namely:
Et(mt+1cn,t+1) =
Et(cnt+1)
1 + it︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk-neutral valuation
+ covt(mt+1, cnt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
. (3)
We have:
Et(cnt+1) = pint × Et{1− rnt+1|rnt+1 ≤ 1} (4)
and:
covt(mt+1, cnt+1) =
covt(mt+1, cnt+1)
vart(mt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk=βnt
× vart(mt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
market price of risk=λt
. (5)
II.B Towards an empirical specification
We assume that the conditional expectation Et(mt+1cn,t+1) is a function of market informa-
tion available at time t. Specifically, we assume:
pint = pi(xnt; θ) (6)
Et{1− rnt+1|rnt+1 ≤ 1} = γ(xnt; θ) (7)
covt(mt+1, cnt+1)
vart(mt+1)
= β(xnt; θ) (8)
vart(mt+1) = λ(yt; θ), (9)
9For a generalization of the CDS pricing equation to a multi-period contract, see, for example, Augustin
(2018).
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where xnt denotes a (K + 1) × 1 vector of country-specific macro variables (including a
constant, the last element of the xnt vector), yt is a vector of systematic variables, and θ is
a vector of coefficients. Therefore, we can express the one-period CDS spread as:
snt = pi(xnt; θ)γ(xnt; θ) + β(xnt; θ)λ(yt; θ)(1 + it). (10)
We approximate the general specification above with the linear specification:
snt = δ
>
t xnt. (11)
Note that even though we are assuming time-invariant relations linking the fundamentals
xnt and yt to the determinants of CDS spreads, the time-variation in the market price of risk
λ(yt; θ) leads to time-varying relations linking snt to xnt.
The specification (11) can be generalized to a τ -maturity CDS with spread snτt as:
snτt = δt(τ)
>xnt, (12)
where we assume:
δt(τ) = δ1t + δ2tτ. (13)
In this way, we provide a simple semi-non-parametric CDS term structure model, where the
coefficients δ1t capture a “level” effect and the coefficient δ2t a “slope” effect. In the next
section, we introduce a variable-selection approach aimed at selecting the possibly different
factors that matter at different times in explaining the cross-section of CDS spreads.
II.C A Fama-MacBeth specification with variable selection
The empirical specification used in our analysis results directly from the expression derived
for the τ -maturity CDS spread. Based on equations (12)–(13), we have:
snmt = δ
>
1txnt + δ
>
2t(xnt × τm) + nmt. (14)
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Note that the dimension of each cross-section at time t is given by NM , where N is the
number of countries and M is the number of CDS maturities. Therefore, since in our sample
we have 11 countries and 4 maturities, we then have a total of 11 × 4 = 44 cross-sectional
observations at every time t. This relatively small cross-section complicates the estimation
process as the K+1 country-specific macro-variables in xnt enter in equation (14) both alone
and then interacted with τ .
We address the issue above by implementing a LASSO-type penalty regression (Tibshi-
rani, 1996). This approach reduces the dimensionality of the covariate space, allowing us to
estimate the cross-sectional regressions even when the initial set of regressors exceeds the
number of cross-sectional observations. Moreover, the LASSO translates into a time-varying
variable selection algorithm, as we discard those covariates that make no contribution in
explaining the cross-section of CDSs at each time t. Relative to standard approaches to
specification search, such as step-wise regression, the LASSO has the advantage that it op-
timizes the out-of-sample performance of the regression model, in the spirit of “calibrating”
a pricing model on one set of CDS contracts and then applying that model to price another
set of contracts.
The econometric procedure contemplates as many cross-sectional regressions as the num-
ber of time-series observations. In so doing, the procedure is analogous to the first-step of
the Fama-MachBeth procedure. Indeed, after running T LASSO-type cross-sectional regres-
sions, we focus on the time-t’s coefficients by stacking them together, and hence obtaining
the time-series of the sensitivities towards the macro-variables (alone and interacted with τ).
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II.D LASSO: motivation and implementation
The motivation for using the LASSO algorithm is twofold.10 First, as highlighted above, the
initial number of covariates exceeds the number of cross-sectional observations. A natural
solution to the problem is to apply the so-called “bet on sparsity principle”, namely, to
assume that the underlying true model contains only relatively few nonzero parameters.
This principle is implemented via the LASSO algorithm, which constrains or regularizes the
estimation process, leading to nonzero coefficients for a subset of few variables, and forcing
the remaining coefficients to zero.
The second and related reason behind the use of the LASSO is the “philosophy” un-
derlying this approach to regression analysis. It is well known that regularization seeks a
compromise between interpretability and flexibility, by excluding covariates whose coeffi-
cients are close to zero.11 In doing this, redundant and noisy information (covariates) are
discarded, as they are not useful in characterizing the response variable.
Sparsity is a pervasive concept in our “data-driven” era, where ever-increasing amounts
of data lead to natural questions, such as: “why go through so much effort to acquire all
the data when most of what we get will be thrown away?” ((Donoho, 2006)). Questions to
which common sense suggests to measure only the effects present in the portion of the data
that will not end up being thrown away. This is exactly the perspective that we embrace,
by aiming to characterize the cross-sections of sovereign CDS spreads while selecting a small
number of covariates that explain most of the variation in the response. Agnostically, we
10There is increased usage of plain and advanced LASSO methods in economics (for e.g., (De Mol et al.,
2008); (Song and Bickel, 2011); (Fan et al., 2011); (Kock, 2016); (Li and Chen, 2014); (Gefang, 2014); (Kock
and Callot, 2015)), and finance ((Brodie et al., 2009); (Fan et al., 2012); (DeMiguel et al., 2009); (Scherer,
2015); (Bruder et al., 2013); (Freyberger et al., 2017); (Feng et al., 2019); Chinco et al. (2019)).
11This is the so-called bias-variance trade-off: the choice of a more exhaustive set of covariates reduces the
estimation bias but increases the variance of the estimates.
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assume that although all of the available macro variables are in principle equally important,
we expect that in any cross-section only a small number really matters and that over time
the sub-set of relevant covariates can change based on changing investors’ views.
Analytically, the LASSO algorithm estimates regression parameters by imposing a con-
straint on the sum of the absolute values of the slope coefficients, namely on the total `1 norm
of the parameter vector (excluding the constant). In our context, cross-sectional regressions
(equation (14)) are estimated by solving the following problem:
min
δ1t, δ2t
{ 1
2NM
{‖snmt − [δ>1txnt + δ>2t(xnt × τm)‖22]} (15)
subject to ‖δ˜t‖1 ≤ c, where δ˜t is the vector of slope parameters, ‖ · ‖2 is the vector Euclidean
norm, and c is the tuning parameter which shrinks and forces coefficients equal to zero.
Smaller values of c restrict the dimension of the parameter space by forcing more coefficients
to zero, while larger values tend to include more covariates up until convergence to the
OLS solution. Since c controls the complexity of the model, a key issue is how to select
the best value for this parameter. As pointed out in Chinco et al. (2019), there is no a
priori theoretically optimal value for c. Therefore, we rely on the standard cross-validation
procedure, through which the data set (the cross-section of sovereign CDS contracts) is split
into two sub-sets, using one sub-set (the training set) to estimate the model and then judge
the goodness of the prediction based on the remainder of the data (the test set).
More specifically, we first randomly split the full data-set into n sub-sets, each containing
the same number of observations. Typically n varies between 5 to 10. In our implementation,
the LASSO estimation is run following the cyclical coordinate descent algorithm outlined in
Friedman et al. (2010) and developed in the the R package glmnet, where we set n equal to
default value of 10. Hence, the algorithm estimates the model based on n − 1 (= 9) data
sets and the remaining data set is used to evaluate the out-of-sample model performance in
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terms of root mean squared error (RMSE) of the predictions. This process is executed for
different values of c, thereby obtaining predictions from a variety of models, ranging from
the all-inclusive model (c → ∞) to the model with no covariates (c → 0). This process is
repeated for all the n data sets, each one playing the role of the test set, while the remaining
n− 1 groups act as the training set.
We then obtain n estimates of the prediction error for different values of c, which are then
averaged out producing the cross-validation error for each value of c. The LASSO solution
corresponds to the model showing the minimum cross-validation error. In our implemen-
tation, we use an increasing sequence of values for c, starting at the lowest value cmin, for
which the entire vector of slope parameters is set to zero, and then adding increments, up
to the value cmax, for which we have the OLS solution. In total, for each cross-section, we
use a sequence of 400 values for c, which is substantially higher than the default setting in
gmlnet of 100, with the aim of improving the accuracy of the modelling choice.
III Time-varying sensitivities to the macro factors
The daily time series of the intercept and the most important cross-sectional LASSO-type
coefficients are displayed in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.12 Since the covariates are stan-
dardized by their cross-sectional standard deviation before running the procedure, the coef-
ficients are scale-independent, which helps to assess the variable importance for each macro-
fundamental based on the absolute value of the coefficient itself.
At first glance, the dynamics of the stacked coefficients exhibit significant time variation,
with a prominent role played by the average term-structure level effect (δ01t). The macro-
12These figures are further discussed in Section IV, where we identify regimes characterized by different
dynamics of the macro-sensitivities.
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sensitivities exhibit an increased variability in 2010, while they are essentially dormant in
2009, to explode later in 2011-2012, and calm down in 2013. Our findings are generally
consistent with Bernoth and Erdogan (2013), who show that the impact of fiscal policy
variables and general investors’ risk aversion on sovereign yield spreads in Europe was not
constant over time. However, our results are in contrast with the authors’ view that it is
plausible to think of the time-varying sensitivities as “changing gradually over time, rather
than having a discrete break-point between regimes.” Our results indicate, instead, that
the time-varying macro-sensitivities exhibit substantial jumpiness in their dynamics, with
sudden and discrete changes in “regime.”
Tables 4 and 5 report summary statistics computed over the entire period for all the
cross-sectional coefficient estimates. The column “Zeros” is informative as to the number of
times, expressed as ratio over the total number of cross-sections, in which the variable made
no contribution in explaining the cross-section of CDS spreads and was discarded by the
LASSO algorithm. This number should be read carefully, as it is informative only about the
“importance persistence” of the variable, regardless of how much the specific explanatory
power of that variable was—this analysis is performed in the next section. The bank risk
indicator was the most selected level-effect variable, being discarded in less than one third
of the estimations, while among the slope-effect variables, GIPSI exhibits a ratio of 0.688,
the lowest value among all slope-effect coefficient estimates.
A few findings are worthy of note. First, the coefficient for GDP growth has the highest
average value (in absolute terms), both for level and slope effects.13 GDP growth impacts
negatively (positively), on average, the level (slope) of the term structure of CDS spreads.
13Since all regressors are cross-sectionally standardized and de-meaned, the intercept represents the average
CDS spread across all countries and maturities, whereas the level and slope coefficients represent the effect,
in basis points, of a one (cross-sectional) standard deviation increase in the corresponding covariates.
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Assuming, in first approximation, a constant expected loss given default, this evidence is con-
sistent with the notion that an increase in GDP growth reduces the (risk-adjusted) marginal
probability of default, but that this effect is stronger at short horizons. Second, the term
structure slope effect is flattening-oriented for most of the variables, except for GIPSI, infla-
tion, credit to private sector, credit to government, and exports. For these macro-variables,
all showing positive level effect-type coefficients, the longer the CDS maturity, the higher
the impact on the CDS spread. Third, Min and Max denote high values for all coefficients,
thereby reflecting substantial spikes and, in turn, “jumpy” dynamics of macro-sensitivities,
also confirmed by Figure 3.
While the analysis above provides us with a full description of the time-series dynamics
of the macro-sensitivities, the number of covariates, and their corresponding time-varying
coefficients, complicate the understanding of the underlying economic developments. To
deal with this dimensional problem, in the next section we introduce a simple statistical
procedure to detect homogeneous groups of observations for the cross-sectional regression
coefficients which, in turn, identify regimes in the macro-sensitivity behavior. These regimes
allow us to come up with a synthetic characterization on the changing nature of sovereign
risk in Europe during the 2009–2013 period.
IV Macro-sensitivity regimes
In this section, we present results on the identification of macro-sensitivity regimes based on
the time-series dynamics of the LASSO-type coefficients. As discussed in the introduction,
existing studies on sovereign CDS regimes look at CDS/bond spreads to identify regime
changes and incorporate structural changes in the econometric relationships between the
spreads and the macroeconomic covariates (e.g., Blommestein et al., 2016; Delatte et al.,
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2017). Other authors (e.g., Afonso et al., 2018) arbitrarily define regimes as time dummies
based on the ECB policy intervention decisions and then explore how sovereign risk sensi-
tivity changed once these measures took place. Our approach differs, as we use the data
on macro-sensitivities to identify regimes conceived as homogeneous groups of observations
over the entire observed time period.
IV.A Methodology
Macro-sensitivity regime identification is based on Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990)’s cluster-
ing algorithm: Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM). This algorithm maps a distance matrix
into a specified number of clusters using the concept of “medoids” as the representation of
the cluster centers. Let δ>t = {δ10t, δ20, δ>11t, δ>12t, δ>21t, δ>22t} denote the generic row vector of
the P = T × [(K + 1)M + 1] matrix containing the time-varying parameters from equa-
tion (14), and denote by d(δti , δtj) the dissimilarity between parameter estimates at time ti
and time tj. Let, now, D be the P × P symmetric matrix of dissimilarities.14 Using data
from such matrix D, the algorithm minimizes the distance between δt and a center, i.e. the
“medoid” of that cluster, chosen among the T rows of the matrix δ. Therefore, medoids
are robust representations of the corresponding clusters and act as “mass points” in the
space of parameters δ. In our context, these clusters denote homogeneous time dynamics
of the macro-sensitivities around medoids, and as such identify specific “regimes.” These
regimes have distinctive features that we explore by focusing on the changing structure of
the sovereign risk sources due to both a shift in macroeconomic fundamentals and changes
in risk pricing.
Computationally, the procedure needs to pre-specify the number of clusters before run-
14A common distance one can use is, as in this paper, the Euclidean distance.
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ning the algorithm. In principle, we may view this number as given and related to some
a priori theoretical reasoning or empirical evidence. Alternatively, the number could be
data-driven, based on some of the existing criteria proposed in the literature (see Kaufman
and Rousseeuw, 1990). We choose the number of regimes by running a specific F-test-based
clustering method which looks at the percentage of the explained variance—more precisely,
the ratio of the between-group variance to the total variance—as a function of the number
of clusters.15 The criterion is commonly used in the literature and is based on the between-
group variance, consistent with the concept of “distance” used to identify the homogeneous
cluster of observations. Having the objective to pre-specify the number of crisis regimes,
we run the test over the 4/1/2010–4/25/2013 period, thereby arbitrarily establishing the
5/11/2009–3/31/2010 sub-period as the “pre-crisis” regime. This is consistent with the em-
pirical evidence we discussed in the introduction, as the surge of CDS/bond spreads of GIPSI
countries occurs in April 2010, when Greece activates the 45 billion Euros EU-IMF bailout
and S&P downgrades Greek debt to junk status.
After running the preliminary test to pre-specify the number of clusters, we next execute
the PAM algorithm, and we then scrutinize each regime by measuring the contribution of each
variable in cross-sectional variance of sovereign CDSs spreads. We do this by decomposing
the explained cross-sectional variance of the CDS spreads, varcst (sˆnmt), according to the
following expression:
15More specifically, the number of clusters is chosen by comparing the percentage of variance explained
by the clusters against the number of clusters: the appropriate number of clusters corresponds to the point
in which the marginal gain, expressed in terms of additional explained variance, drops, thereby signaling no
significant information added by the last cluster.
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varcst (sˆnτmt) =
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
[
K+1∑
k=1
covcst (sˆnτmt, δˆ11ktxnkt) + cov
cs
t (sˆnτmt, δˆ12tGIPSIn)
]
+
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
[
K+1∑
k=1
covcst (sˆnτmt, δˆ21ktxnktτm) + cov
cs
t (sˆnτmt, δˆ22tGIPSInτm)
]
. (16)
Hence, the cross-sectional variance of CDS spreads is split into components due to the
different K + 1 explanatory variables, where the individual contribution by each variable is
computed as:∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1 cov
cs
t (sˆnτmt, δˆ11ktxnkt)
varcst (sˆnτmt)
;
∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1 covcs(sˆnτmt, δˆ12tGIPSIn)
varcst (sˆnτmt)
(17)
for level effects, and:∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1 cov
cs
t [sˆnτm,t, δˆ21kt(xnkt × τm)]
varcst (sˆnτmt)
;
∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1 cov
cs
t [sˆnτmt, δˆ22t(GIPSIn × τm)]
varcst (sˆnτmt)
(18)
for slope effects. While such a decomposition changes over time, we compute averages,
conditional on the regime, thereby identifying the variables that matter most, on average,
during the non-crisis and crisis regimes.
IV.B Results
The regimes obtained as the output of the clustering procedure detailed in the previous
section tell us that, within each cluster, macro-sensitivities exhibited distinctive and homo-
geneous patterns of behavior. We now scrutinize the regimes, focusing on the summary
statistics of the LASSO-type coefficients and the cross-sectional variance decompositions,
equations (17) and (18). Each regime can be then identified with the key variables driving
the cross-section of CDS spreads.
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We display the regime time-line in Figure 2, where we see the three crisis regimes (regimes
1, 2, and 3), as well as the pre-crisis regime arbitrarily set from 5/11/2009 to 3/31/2010
(regime 0), where the different shaded areas identify the different regimes. In the same
figure, we also display the time-varying intercept, which corresponds, by construction, to the
cross-sectional average of sovereign CDS spreads.16
The regimes identified by our PAM procedure are broadly consistent with the turning
points discussed in the introduction. The pre-crisis regime is characterized by moderate,
but increasing CDS spreads, until April 2010. At that point we have the Greece-driven
transition to the first crisis regime, which continues until the third quarter of 2011. We then
have fluctuations between the first and second regime until November 2011, when we enter
the third and most risky regime, in terms of the cross-sectional average of CDS spreads.
Starting with September 2012, the average CDS spread comes down as we first transition
to the second regime, and finally we revert back to the first regime, starting in March 2013,
when the average CDS spread is around 220 basis points.
To better interpret the pre-crisis and crisis regimes, Tables 6–7 report summary statistics
of the LASSO-type coefficients conditional on regimes, and Table 8 shows the value of the
cross-sectional CDS spread variance explained by each variable according to equations (17)
and (18). The values of explained variance are also normalized by the highest value as
vkt
vkth
× 100, where vk is the value of the cross-sectional CDS variance explained by variable
k and vkth is highest value of the explained variance out of all K + 1 covariates. With the
purpose of identifying the most informative variables for each regime, we set 50% as the cut-
off value for this normalized measure, thereby highlighting only those variables showing an
explanatory power not less than 50%, compared to the most informative variable associated.
16Remember that the LASSO-type regression was run by cross-sectionally de-meaning and standardizing
each covariate.
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Such an approach seems reasonable in order to obtain a parsimonious characterization of
each regime.
The following patterns emerge:
• The pre-crisis regime, from May 2009 to March 2010, displays moderate, while increas-
ing, macro-sensitivities, with the deficit and GIPSI variables being the main deter-
minants of CDS spreads, followed by the banking risk measure and the banking risk
volatility indicator.
• The first crisis regime covers the April 2010–July 2011 period—which includes the
40 billion Euros Greek bailout and the ensuing widening of the spreads of peripheral
Eurozone countries—and the mid-March–April 2013 period, when Cyprus secured a
10 billion Euros bank bailout from the European Union and the IMF. During this
regime, GIPSI and Loans-to-Government were the main drivers of the cross-section of
sovereign CDS spreads, which averaged around 167 bps.
• The second crisis regime comprises the June–August 2011 and September 2012–mid
March 2013, periods, namely the periods before the peak of the Eurozone crisis and
following the third turning point (Draghi’s July 2012 speech and the announcement
of the OMT program in September 2012), during which we also have the agreement
on the part of European leaders for the European Stability Mechanism to directly
recapitalize banks, rather than having to act through national governments (October
19, 2012). This is an intermediate regime, going from regime 1 to 3 and also from 3
to 1 (see Figure 1a), during which imports and changes in inventories over GDP were
the most influential variables, because of their effect on GDP growth through balance
of payment pressures and increased macroeconomic volatility. The average value of
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of sovereign CDS spreads was around 248 bps. Our coefficient estimates for changes
in inventories over GDP, on average positive during the regime, are consistent with
recent evidence (European Commission, 2015) documenting how firms viewing their
inventory stocks as “too large” are expected to react by cutting production in the
following months, thereby exacerbating economic downturn during crisis periods.
• The third crisis regime takes place between July 2011 (when we have a rebound be-
tween regime 2 and 3) and August 2012. This regime corresponds to the highest risk
phase when average spreads reached 400 bps and the the cross-section of spreads was
mostly explained by GDP growth and employment. The regime includes the Italian
government crisis (November 2011) and the release of the results of the second round
of pan European stress tests (eight European banks failed the stress tests, while 16
were in a “danger zone”).
Our characterization of non-crisis and crisis regimes offers new insights on the economic
mechanisms underlying the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. As pointed out in De Grauwe
and Ji (2013), one view of the crisis is that the surging spreads from 2010 to mid-2012 were
the result of deteriorating fundamentals and the market was just a messenger of bad news.
A second view is that, beginning in 2010, the spreads were panic-driven away from country
fundamentals. The first view would explain why austerity-based measures should be the
right measure of policy intervention. The implications of the second view is that in times of
market panic, central banks should act as liquidity providers.
Our findings accommodate both views. We show that fear and panic disconnected spreads
from fundamentals, but only in regime 1, when being in the GIPSI group of countries was
the key driver for the surge of CDS. In regime 3, on the other hand, at the peak of the
crisis, markets restored a fundamental-based connection with GDP growth, even when the
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ECB intervened to provide essentially unlimited support to the government bond markets.
Then, we move towards regime 2, finally returning to regime 1, where GIPSI is again the
main risk factor, but at a lower average level of spreads and lower GIPSI sensitivity. In
this context, regime 2 appears to be a transition regime, in which we do have a connection
between spreads and risk signals from imports and inventory dynamics.
Interestingly, the interpretation suggested above is also consistent with the effects of the
macro-fundamentals on the CDS spreads during the different stages of the crisis (see Table
7). During the pre-crisis period, macro-fundamentals tend to impact positively both the
level and the slope of the CDS spread curve (“steepening” effect). This is consistent with
the notion that default risk premia, which are more relevant at longer maturities, drive much
of the variation in the term structure of CDS spreads. On the other hand, when the crisis
is the most acute (regime 3), macro-fundamentals tend to impact the level and slope of the
spread curves in opposite directions. This is consistent with the notion that the expected
occurrence of default, which is more relevant at short maturities, drives spread variation.
Also consistent with the notion that fundamentals are most relevant at the height of the
crisis is the evidence in Table 9, showing that the average cross-sectional R-square is highest
in regime 3.
V Macro-sensitivities and financial market volatility
In this section, we explore the link between our LASSO-type coefficients (the macro-sensitivities)
and future equity market volatility. The economic reason for this link is that in a CAPM
setting equity market volatility is directly related to the volatility of the underlying pricing
kernel and the aggregate market price of risk. Hence, we would expect our LASSO-type co-
efficients to correlate with future implied equity volatility for the European equity markets,
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as it is proxied by the one-month volatility index of the Euro Stoxx 50 index (VSTOXX).
Computationally, we run an out-of-sample exercise using observations for the 08/01/2012–
04/25/2013 period to dynamically estimate, i.e., by adding one observation each day, several
predictive models. As alternative instruments to the cross-sectional LASSO-type regression
coefficients obtained in the analysis of the previous section, we consider:
• the coefficients of LASSO-type cross-sectional regressions of the CDS spreads on the
country-specific first principal components extracted from each of the five groups of
macro and financial indicators described in Section I;17
• the five-year country-specific CDS spreads;
• the GIPSI and NON-GIPSI first principal components extracted from the sovereign
CDS spreads;
• the GIPSI and NON-GIPSI first principal components extracted from the real-time
macroeconomic variables.
To assess the predictive ability of different approaches we rely on the Root Mean Squared
Errors (RMSE) and the Mean Absolute Squared Errors (MAPE). The results in Table 10
show that the preferred approach is the “parsimonious” version of our LASSO-on-LASSO-
type coefficients, namely the LASSO-type penalty regressions run on the LASSO-type Fama-
MacBeth procedure on country-specific principal components. This approach dominates all
alternatives in terms of both RMSE and MAPE.
As reported in the same Table 10, the Diebold-Mariano test confirms the robustness of
our results. Another interesting finding has to do with the time dynamics of the estimated
17Principal components are estimated dynamically as well, as in Beber et al. (2015), within the following
clusters of macro-variables: (1) Labour market; (2) Prices and costs; (3) Money and credit; (4) Output; (5)
Banking.
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coefficients for the best performer. In Table 11 we report the absolute values of the average
coefficient estimates as well as the ratios of the absolute values of the individual coefficient
estimates over the sums of the absolute values of all the coefficient estimates. While slope
effects play a minor role in explaining the cross-section of CDS spreads, the slope-effect
coefficients have a substantial role in this out-of-sample exercise, with an average weight
around 33%, versus 55% for level-effect coefficients, while the remaining 10% is accounted
for by the time-varying intercept.
VI Conclusions
We construct a new real-time, daily-frequency data set to examine the relation between
sovereign CDS spreads and macro-economic fundamentals during the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. We provide several new and important results. First, we document pronounced
time-variation in the sensitivity of CDS spreads to the country-specific macro indicators.
Second, we identify three distinct risk regimes based on the general level of CDS premia,
the sensitivity of CDS premia to different macro indicators, and the GIPSI connotation.
It is during the regime corresponding to the most intense phase of the crisis that CDS
spreads reflected macro fundamentals the most, whereas before the crisis it was only the
GIPSI connotation to matter. Third, we show how the macro-sensitivities predict future
equity market volatility better than competitive sets of instruments, consistent with the
notion that expected future risk is an important driver of how CDS spreads react to macro
information. We also show that slope effects are important in predicting implied equity
volatility. In summary, we provide a new and complete characterization of the links between
CDS spreads, macro fundamentals, and default risk. We trust that this characterization will
prove useful to both market participants and policy makers.
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Variables in Real-Time
Variable Description Cluster
unempl Unemployment rate Labour market
empl Employment rate, total Labour market
infl Inflation rate Price and costs
ind price Industrial Producer Prices (% change) Price and costs
labour Hourly labour cost (price index) (% change) Price and costs
m3 M3 (variation) money, credit and debt
loan priv Loans to private sector (variation) money, credit and debt
loan gov Loans to government (variation) money, credit and debt
cr priv Credit to private sector (variation) money, credit and debt
cr gov Credit to government (variation) money, credit and debt
deficit Public sector deficit over GDP money, credit and debt
gdp Real GDP growth output
cons Consumption growth output
gov cons Government consumption growth output
inv Investment growth output
invent gdp Changes in inventories over nominal GDP output
ex Exports growth output
im Imports growth output
ind prod Industrial production growth (price index) output
bank Banking risk proxy banking
vol bank 20 days rolling windows realized volatility of bank banking
The table reports the list of macroeconomic variables we collected in real-time and used in our analysis.
Variables are grouped according to their ownership category reported in the column Cluster: (i) labour
market; (ii) price and costs; (iii) money, credit and debt; (iv) output; (v) banking.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics, Level-effect LASSO Coefficients
Zeros Min Max Mean StdDev
alpha, bank and GIPSI
alpha 0.000 41.798 499.373 226.076 140.341
gipsi 0.688 0.000 158.968 15.380 32.197
bank 0.309 -222.888 27.936 -28.100 45.645
vol bank 0.588 -13.894 357.487 23.674 54.555
employment
unempl 0.634 -85.222 80.380 0.335 13.233
empl 0.603 -345.595 26.914 -30.741 60.036
prices and costs
infl 0.622 -53.918 174.684 9.769 30.133
ind price 0.492 -89.566 300.769 16.071 57.634
labour 0.597 -282.825 62.137 -5.672 25.868
money, debt, and credit
m3 0.726 -167.288 71.262 -5.744 25.652
loan priv 0.672 -135.109 56.167 -3.037 17.808
loan gov 0.593 -110.797 253.166 23.120 59.678
cr priv 0.740 -43.668 93.698 2.397 8.493
cr gov 0.518 -209.265 98.281 2.517 37.375
deficit 0.602 -106.568 30.940 -8.031 16.444
output
gdp 0.461 -380.469 30.770 -52.732 89.242
cons 0.591 -201.389 95.771 1.453 26.134
gov cons 0.651 -234.760 248.033 3.978 47.828
inv 0.639 -205.101 68.453 -14.214 31.478
invent gdp 0.492 -289.825 233.722 7.864 58.363
ex 0.606 -68.964 224.381 13.522 38.947
im 0.450 -274.770 55.389 -24.511 45.359
ind prod 0.537 -189.701 41.456 -15.064 29.653
summary statistics - excluding alpha
Mean 0.582 -168.708 126.853 -3.080 38.716
Min 0.309 -380.469 26.914 -52.732 8.493
Max 0.740 0.000 357.487 23.674 89.242
Mean (abs) 13.997
This table reports summary statistics for the daily cross-sectional level-effect LASSO coefficient estimates
computed over the entire period from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013. Cross-sectional regressions (equation (14))
are estimated by solving the LASSO problem (equation (15)). All regressors are cross-sectionally
standardized and de-meaned. Therefore, the intercept (alpha) represents the average CDS spread across all
countries and maturities, whereas the coefficients represent the effect, in basis points, of a one
(cross-sectional) standard deviation increase in the corresponding covariates. Column Zeros is the number
of times, expressed as ratio over the total number of cross-sections, in which the variable was discarded by
the LASSO algorithm. Min, Max, Mean, StdDev are the minimum, the maximum, the arithmetic average
and the standard deviation, respectively.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics, Slope-effect LASSO Coefficients
Zeros Min Max Mean StdDev Slope
bank, GIPSI, and tau
gipsi 0.597 -63.417 44.448 1.128 7.945 steep
bank 0.928 0.000 4.648 0.154 0.658 flat
vol bank 0.763 -52.831 17.085 -2.638 9.558 flat
tau 0.787 -40.946 15.469 0.244 3.540 steep
employment
unempl 0.949 -30.687 16.918 -0.208 1.863 flat
empl 0.624 -0.859 67.612 2.846 6.797 flat
prices and costs
infl 0.780 -45.444 13.084 0.971 4.194 steep
ind price 0.818 -54.111 7.685 -2.171 7.563 flat
labour 0.809 -18.248 24.839 1.017 3.355 flat
money, debt, and credit
m3 0.711 -1.631 90.517 3.224 11.084 flat
loan priv 0.897 -10.499 57.798 0.316 3.118 flat
loan gov 0.666 -97.498 3.085 -7.290 16.823 flat
cr priv 0.830 -22.589 14.696 0.157 2.647 steep
cr gov 0.687 -10.459 47.307 3.673 9.655 steep
deficit 0.864 -0.736 70.762 2.552 9.678 flat
output
gdp 0.791 -1.250 86.085 7.564 19.455 flat
cons 0.846 -66.662 24.350 -0.962 10.111 flat
gov cons 0.811 -41.551 23.747 -0.289 4.952 flat
inv 0.859 -1.971 30.048 1.342 4.938 flat
invent gdp 0.634 -41.738 36.978 -1.430 8.880 flat
ex 0.708 -27.494 29.648 1.654 7.458 steep
im 0.627 -6.610 61.308 2.265 8.840 flat
ind prod 0.691 -6.829 78.093 2.039 7.313 flat
summary statistics
Mean 0.768 -27.414 38.670 0.723 7.586
Min 0.597 -97.498 3.085 -7.290 0.658
Max 0.949 0.000 90.517 7.564 19.455
Mean (abs) 2.006
This table reports summary statistics for the daily cross-sectional slope-effect LASSO coefficient estimates
computed over the entire period from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013. Coefficient estimates comes from the same
cross-sectional regressions used for level-effect coefficients (equations (14))-(15)) and reported in Table 4,
and relate to covariates interacted with CDS maturity as well as the maurity alone (tau). Column Zeros is
the number of times, expressed as ratio over the total number of cross-sections, in which the variable was
discarded by the LASSO algorithm. Min, Max, Mean, StdDev are the minimum, the maximum, the
arithmetic average and the standard deviation, respectively. Slope denotes the flattening (flat) or steepeing
(step) oriented effect for each variable: when the sign of the level- and slope-effect are the same, the term
structure is steepening-oriented with higher impact on CDS spreads for longer maturities, otherwise
(different sign of the level- and slope-effect coefficients) the term structure is flattening-oriented with higher
impact on CDS spreads for shorter maturities.
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Table 9: Average Cross-sectional R2-s
Regime Overall
0 1 2 3
0.9771 0.9837 0.9897 0.9906 0.9850
This table presents the average cross-sectional R-squared (explained variance) of the model (equation (14))
in the different regimes.
44
Table 10: VSTOXX Out-of-sample Predictability
RMSE MAPE D-M test
Lasso on Lasso 6.20 27.70 -2.994(0.003)
Lasso on Country PC Lasso FM 3.56 15.54 -
OLS on Country PC Lasso FM 3.82 16.51 -2.716(0.007)
PC on Lasso coeff 8.87 44.94 -8.974(0.000)
CDS 5yr 5.86 27.65 -5.982(0.000)
PC CDS GIPSI and NON-GIPSI 6.93 36.09 -8.917(0.000)
GIPSI and NON-GIPSI PC 6.29 30.35 -7.396(0.000)
This table reports diagnostics of the out-of-sample forecasting ability of the LASSO coefficients for the
one-month Euro Stoxx 50 index (VSTOXX) implied volatility index, three months ahead. Every day, we
add one-t-ahead observation to the previous fit period tin and we use the new estimation period to update
the model estimates. Next, the new estimates are used to predict 3-month ahead. Mathematically we then
have: tin = 1, . . . , T inj and t
out = T inj + 1, . . . , Tj . t
in is from 5/11/2009 to 7/31/2012, tout is from
8/1/2012 to 4/25/2013, and predictions 3-month ahead predout are from 10/24/2012 to 4/25/2013. The
out-of-sample diagnostics computed using predout are the Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE), the Mean
Absolute Squared Errors (MAPE) and the Diebold-Mariano (D-M) test. The table reports diagnostics for
the following list of alternative models: (i.) LASSO-on-LASSO-type coefficients (Lasso on Lasso); (ii.)
LASSO-on-LASSO-type Fama-MacBeth on country-specific principal components (Lasso on Country PC
Lasso FM); (iii.) OLS-on-LASSO-type Fama-MacBeth on country-specific principal components (OLS on
Country PC Lasso FM); (iv.) LASSO on principal components computed on LASSO-type coefficients (PC
on Lasso coeff); (v.) OLS-on-Sovereign CDS 5yrs (CDS 5yr); (vi.) OLS on GIPSI and NON-GIPSI
sovereign CDS principal components (PC CDS GIPSI and NON-GIPSI); (vii.) OLS on GIPSI and
NON-GIPSI principal components extracted from the real-time macroeconomic data (GIPSI and
NON-GIPSI PC). Principal components are estimated dynamically as in Beber et al. (2015) within the
following clusters of macro-variables (see table 1): labour market; prices and costs; money and credit;
output; banking.
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Table 11: Lasso on Country PC Lasso FM, Level- and Slope-type Weigths
Mean Sum Weight
Alpha 0.77 0.77 0.10
Level-type
gipsi 0.02
PC labour 0.14
PC price 0.97
PC money 1.69
PC output 0.55
PC banking 1.17
4.54 0.57
Slope-type
gipsi 1.08
PC labour 0.35
PC price 0.19
PC money 0.16
PC output 0.28
PC banking 0.24
tau 0.36
2.64 0.33
This table presents the time dynamics of the estimated coefficients for the LASSO-on-LASSO-type
Fama-MacBeth on country-specific principal components (Lasso on Country PC Lasso FM), selected as the
best performer in the out-of-sample exercise (see Table 10). The values in table are the absolute values of
the average coefficient estimates used to make the predictions out-of-sample as well as the ratios of the
absolute values of the individual coefficient estimates over the sums of the absolute values of all the
coefficient estimates. Alpha is the intercept; gipsi is the LASSO coefficient on the dummy variable denoting
the peripheral connotation; PC labour, PC price, PC money, PC output, PC banking are the LASSO
coefficients on the first country-specific principal component extracted from the clusters of macro-variables
(table 1) following Beber et al. (2015); tau is the LASSO coefficient on the CDS maturities.
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(a) Sovereign CDS spreads
(b) GDP growth (c) Unemployment rate
(d) Inflation rate (e) Government deficit
Figure 1: CDS spreads and macro fundamentals
The figure shows the 5-yr sovereign CDS (a), and the following key macroeconomic variables in real-time
over the period from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013: GDP growth (b), unemployment rate (c), inflation rate (d),
government deficit expressed as ratio over the GDP (e). AT is Austria, BE is Belgium, CY is Cyprus, DE
is Germany, ES is Spain, FI is Finland, FR is France, IE is Ireland, IT is Italy, PT is Portugal.
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Figure 2: Alphas and regimes
The figure displays the daily intercept estimation (Alpha) of the model (equation (14)) over the period
from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013. Pre-crisis and crisis regimes are colored as grey (regime 0), pink (regime 1),
yellow (regime 2) and light blue (Regime 3).
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Figure 3: Most important coefficients
The figure shows the daily cross-sectional LASSO coefficients of the model (equation (14)) over the period
from 5/11/2009 to 4/25/2013 for the most important covariates, as result of the covariance decomposition
per regime (Table 8). The time patterns of the coefficients are recursively weighted with
exponentially-decaying weights (the smoothing parameter is set at 0.95).
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